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NOTES
BIRNBAUM: REVISITED AND TRIUMPHANT-
BLUE CHIP STAMPS v. MANOR DRUG STORES
One of the most perplexing facets of the securities laws has been
determining the limits of the plaintiff class under the broad anti-fraud
provisions of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934' and
rule 10b-52 promulgated by the Securities Exchange Commission in
1942. The recent decision in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,I
holding that only actual purchasers or sellers may maintain actions
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 of the securities laws, is the Supreme
Court's response to this complex field of litigaton, marking the first time
that the Court elected to squarely confront the issue of standing in
securities litigation. This Note will include a brief examination of the
remedial provisions within the securities laws and a discussion of
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,' the landmark case which is the
progenitor of the law of standing in this area. This discussion will be
followed by an analysis and critique of the recent Blue Chip Stamps
decision, and concluding observations and recommendations regarding
standing to sue in securities litigation.
SECTION 10(b), RULE 10b-5, AND THE Birnbaum DOCTRINE
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 broadly pro-
scribes the "use of any manipulative or deceptive device[s]," and to
that end directs the Securities and Exchange Commission to prescribe
such rules as are "necessary and appropriate." Pursuant to this author-
1. 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1970). See note 5, infra.
2. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1969). See note 7, infra.
3. 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
4. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
5. 15 U.S.C. §78j (b) (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange ...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
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ity, and under less than casual circumstances,6 the SEC promulgated
rule 10b-57 in 1942.s Unlike other sections of the securities laws,9 section
10(b) did not provide express civil remedies for violation of its provi-
sions. In 1946, the seminal case of Kardon v. National Gypsum Corp.,"
held that a private civil action was implied from the section and the
6. The origin of the rule has been best recalled by Milton Freeman, an SEC attorney
at the time of its announcement in Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities
Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967).
7. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1969) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
8. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3220 (May 21, 1942) reads as follows:
The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the adoption of a
rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection with the purchase of securi-
ties. The previously existing rules against fraud in the purchase of securities
applied only to brokers or dealers. The new rule closes a loophole in the protec-
tion against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals
or companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase.
The text of the Commission's action follows:
The Securities and Exchange Commission, deeming it necessary for the exer-
cise of the functions vested in it and necessary and appropriate in the public
interest and for the protection of investors so to do, pursuant to authority con-
ferred upon it by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, particularly sections 10(b)
and 23(A) thereof, hereby adopts the following Rule X-10b-5 ....
9. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 §§11(a), 12(2), 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §§77k(a), 771(2),
77q(a) (1970). Sections 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act provide civil remedies for the deceived
purchaser of securities sold with the use of a misleading prospectus. If the prospectus is
part of a registration statement which has become "effective" under the Act, the action
is cognizable under section 11(a). If the statement has not become effective, it is cogniza-
ble under section 12(2). Section 17(a), upon which 10b-5 was largely based, renders it
unlawful for "any person in the offer or sale of any security" to commit fraud by use of
any of the jurisdictional means. A violation of clause (2) of section 17(a) results in liability
under sections 11(a) or 12(2). There is no specific civil action provided for violation of
clauses (1) or (3) of section 17(a). Additionally, section 17(a) does not provide any remedy
for the defrauded seller of securities. See also 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD §2.1
(Supp. 1970) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERG].
10. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See also Fishman v. Raytheon Mfg. Corp., 188 F.2d
783 (2d Cir. 1951), which recognized the implied remedy in favor of sellers.
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rule." Judge Kirkpatrick, however, omitted from his opinion any discus-
sion of the limitations upon this implied civil action. Six years later, a
most distinguished panel of the prestigious second circuit, in the land-
mark case of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,12 ruled that section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 of the securities laws protect only the actual pur-
chaser or seller of securities and that the protections do not extend to
fraudulent mismanagement.'3
In Birnbaum, shareholders of Newport Steel brought a derivative and
representative suit. They alleged violation of the section and the rule
against defendants Feldmann, whose ownership of 40% of the outstand-
ing common stock gave him voting control, the other directors of New-
port, and the Wilport Company. Feldmann, in his official capacity as
president of Newport Steel had rejected a merger offer from Follansbee
Steel Corporation which "would have been highly profitable to all the
stockholders of Newport."" Instead, he had sold his shares to defendant
Wilport at a substantial premium-twice the existing market value of
the stock. The plaintiffs, who neither purchased nor sold shares, and
thus had not participated in the securities transaction, contended that
defendant Feldmann had violated the rule by selling his shares at a
substantial profit.'
The plaintiffs further alleged that inasmuch as the language "any
person" was a general proscription against fraud, the application of rule
10b-5 was not limited to the actual purchasers or sellers of securities.
This construction was supported by the rule's language "in connection
with the purchase of sale or any security." If the purpose of the rule was
to limit its operation to the actual purchase or sale of securities, the
phrase "in connection with" would be superfluous.'"
In the formulation of its opinion, the court of appeals examined the
scheme of SEC regulation and the underlying purpose for the promulga-
tion of the rule. The court noted that prior to the adoption of the rule
the only prohibitions against fraud committed by the purchaser of se-
curities found in section 17(a) of the 1933 Act" and section 15(c) of the
11. 69 F. Supp. at 514. "[fIn view of the general purpose of the Act, the mere omission
of an express provision for civil liability is not sufficient to negative what the general law
implies."
12. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). The three judges sitting in
review were Augustus Hand, who wrote the opinion, Learned Hand, and Chief Judge
Swan.
13. See notes 18-21 and accompanying text infra.
14. 193 F.2d at 462.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 463.
17. 15 U.S.C. §17q(a) (1970). See note 9, supra.
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1934 Act 8 were against a broker or a dealer. Additionally, the SEC, in
its adoption of rule 10b-5, published a statement indicating in part that
the rule was designed to "close . . .[this] loophole" by prohibiting
fraud in connection with the purchase of securities." The court con-
cluded "that the Commission was attempting only to make the same
prohibitions contained in Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act applicable to
purchasers as well as to sellers.""0 Rejecting plaintiffs' contention that
this interpretation was too narrow, the court presented what has come
to be known as the Birnbaum doctrine: " . . . that Section [10(b)] was
directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent practice
usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities rather then at
fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs, and that Rule X-10b-5
extended protection only to the defrauded purchaser or seller."',
For the past twenty years the federal judiciary has struggled with
these substantive (no fraudulent mismanagement protection) and pro-
cedural (purchaser or seller requirement) limitations. It is clear that at
this time the substantive limitation has all but disappeared as a stum-
bling block to litigation under the section and the rule." The Birnbaum
procedural limitation, on the other hand, has experienced a more check-
ered history and has even caused one court to comment: "Birnbaum has
been shot at by expert marksmen . . . Bloody but unbowed,
Birnbaum still stands."23
The limitations initially advanced in Birnbaum were by no means
exclusive. Since the recognition of an implied remedy in 1946, substan-
tive limitations borrowed from the law of torts, including materiality,"
reasonable reliance,2 5 privity,2" and causation 7 have become necessary
elements of the plaintiff's cause of action. As was the case with the strict
purchaser-seller requirements prior to Blue Chip Stamps, however,
these limitations have been significantly relaxed.2" In fact, in an attempt
18. 15 U.S.C. §78o(c) (1970).
19. 193 F.2d at 463. See note 8, supra.
20. 193 F.2d at 463.
21. Id. at 464.
22. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
"Since there was a 'sale' of a security and since fraud was used 'in connection with' it,
there is redress under §10(b), whatever might be available as a remedy under state law."
Id. at 12.
23. Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970).
24. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965).
25. See, e.g., Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966).
26. See, e.g., Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & TV Corp., 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
27. See, e.g., Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
28. See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968).
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to give effect to the congressional purpose evinced in the securities laws
and still delimit the contours of the cause of action, the courts have
tended to use these limitations interchangeably. That is, as the substan-
tive limitations became less important in a particular context,4 the
purchaser-seller requirement assumed added importance. Conversely,
in those cases where the plaintiff was not an actual purchaser or seller,
the elements of causation, materiality and reliance were thrust to the
fore of judicial examination.29
For the most part, the litigation brought under the section and the
rule during the past three decades has demonstrated judicial receptive-
ness to an entire spectrum of 10b-5 claims. This receptivity has not
passed without a continuous reassessment of the Birnbaum purchaser-
seller limitation. As one article recently noted:
the subsequent decline in "face-to-face" dealings between purchasers
and sellers, the complexity of securities transactions, and the increas-
ing sophistication of fraudulent schemes have required courts . . to
expand the definitions of purchase and sale, as well as the class of
persons falling into the category of purchasers and sellers2.
In some instances, several courts, including the seventh circuit, have
rejected the purchaser-seller doctrine in its entirety'.3 Since there was a
conflict among the circuits" and an absence of any authoritative guide-
lines from the Supreme Court regarding the scope of actions brought
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5,33 the Supreme Court granted
29. See Boone & McGowan, Standing to Sue Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 49 TEXAS L. REV.
617, 619-30 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Boone & McGowan].
30. Froelich & Spiegel, Standing of Federal Securities Plaintiffs- Which Way the
Trend, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 510, 514 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Froelich & Spiegel].
31. See, e.g., Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973); Young
v. Seaboard Corp., 360 F. Supp. 490 (D. Utah 1973).
32. See note 31, supra. For two articles describing the decision-making process under
the section and the rule, see Cohen, The Development of Rule 10b-5, 23 Bus. LAW. 593
(1968) ("ad hoc"); Marsh, What Lies Ahead Under Rule lOb-5? 24 Bus. LAW. 69 (1968)
("chaotic").
33. The history of Supreme Court review of 10(b) and 10b-5 may be best characterized
as sparse. The Court's first occasion to interpret these provisions was in SEC v. National
Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), some twenty-seven years following the promulgation of
10b-5. No doubt, much of the confusion in this area of securities litigation may be
attributed to those instances in which certiorari was denied, resulting in an absence of
guidance from the Court. See, e.g., Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d
654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Dudley v. Southeastern Factor &
Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971); Kahan v. Rosentiel,
424 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air
Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Dahso v. Susque-
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certiorari to Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Store.34 The Court
thereby agreed to review the status of the purchaser-seller limitation for
the first time since Birnbaum was decided.3
HISTORY OF THE CASE
36
In 1963, the United States instituted a civil action charging the Blue
Chip Stamps Co. and participating retailers for violation of the Sher-
man Act. This litigation was terminated by entry of a consent decree in
1967.17 Some of the participating retailers who used Blue Chip Stamps
to stimulate patronage in their business owned 90% of the Blue Chip
Stamps stock. Other retailers who used Blue Chip Stamps in their busi-
ness but owned no stock, appeared before the court as amici curiae.
They requested that any decree recognize their entitlement to an equita-
ble interest in the Blue Chip Stamps stock.
The consent decree, which reflected these various claims and conten-
tions,31 resulted in an offering of 55% of the common stock to retail users
who were not stockholders of the old company. The shares were to be
offered on a prorata basis determined by the quantity of stamps issued
to each of these non-stockholding users during a designated period. The
offering was to be made in units consisting of three shares of common
stock plus a $100 debenture at the price of $101. Since each unit had a
reasonable market value of $315, this offer was intended as a bargain.
Pursuant to provisions of the consent decree and in compliance with
hanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
34. 419 U.S. 992 (1974).
35. Similarly, the Court did not have an occasion to deal with the decision of Kardon
v. National Gypsum Corp., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), see notes 7-8 and accompany-
ing text supra, until more then twenty years later, at which time, the implied private right
of action was acknowledged by a mere footnote. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers
Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). Seven years prior to that decision, however,
the Court recognized that private actions were a "necessary supplement to Commission
action." J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,. 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
36. The facts were taken from the opinion of the district court and the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. See Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 339 F. Supp. 35 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), rev'd, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), appeal rev'd, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
37. United States v. Blue Chip Stamps Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd
sub nor. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968).
38. The consent decree provided in section V:
Blue Chip is ordered and directed to present to the Court. . . a plan for reorgan-
ization of Blue Chip Stamp Co. . . . Upon approval of the plan by the Court,
Blue Chip shall make bona fide and diligent efforts to reorganize the company
pursuant to said plan . . ..
Subsequently, a plan incorporating this order was submitted and approved.
1975]
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applicable securities laws governing a public issue of securities, Blue
Chip Stamps prepared a prospectus. Plaintiffs, however, alleged that it
"was calculated to mislead and dissuade users not knowledgeable of the
true value of said shares from purchasing said shares." 9 Specifically, the
prospectus repeatedly emphasized "Items of Special Interest" which
would have an adverse effect on the value of the offered stock. One such
item, for example, concerned the pendency of claims worth 29 million
dollars against the company; claims which were actually settled for less
than one million dollars. Significantly, these "Items of Special Interest"
were deleted from the prospectus used in the subsequent public offer-
ing. 40
The basis of the 10b-5 cause of action was that the defendant inten-
tionally misled plaintiffs as to the true value of the stock, thereby induc-
ing them not to purchase the stock, and injuring them in an amount
equal to the difference between the offering price of the units and the
fair market value." The plaintiffs' case thus resembled the "aborted
purchaser-seller" exception to the Birnbaum doctrine.2
The district court, relying upon section 28(a) of the Exchange Act, 3
dismissed the complaint by determining that since the plaintiffs neither
purchased nor sold securities, they suffered no actual damages.44 The
39. 492 F.2d at 139.
40. Id. at 139-40.
41. Id. at 140. The plaintiff, Manor Drug Stores, made the following additional allega-
tions to its key 10(b) and lob-5 complaint: (a) the misrepresentations of the directors and
offering shareholders were a violation of section 12 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §771 (1970);
(b) plaintiff is a third party beneficiary under the consent decree and the-offering directors
and shareholders actions breached their duty to plaintiff for which they are liable. The
district court dismissed the section 12 claim on the basis of a failure to purchase and lack
of privity. It also dismissed the beneficiary claim inasmuch as a non-party to an antitrust
decree lacks standing to enforce the same. In the court of appeals and the Supreme Court
only the 10(b) and lob-5 claims were specifically pressed. 339 F. Supp. 35, 38-39 (C.D.
Cal. 1971).
42. For an explanation of the "aborted purchaser-seller" exception see note 125, infra.
43. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §28(a), 15 U.S.C. §78bb(a) (1970) provides in part:
The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any
and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no
person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this
chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions,
a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained
of.
See, e.g., Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975 (1973); Green
V. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). But see
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Myzel v. Fields, 386
F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). See notes 71-73 and accompany-
ing text infra.
44. 339 F. Supp. at 40.
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a divided opinion, reversed,
finding an exception to the Birnbaum requirement in that compliance
with the antitrust decree served the same function as a securities pur-
chase or sales contract. There thus existed a specific identifiable group
with the requisite causation and an objective basis for determination of
loss.45
The Supreme Court, in rejecting both the arguments of the SEC and
of plaintiff-respondents, Manor Drug Stores, held that a private damage
action under rule 10b-5 is limited to actual purchasers or sellers of
securities. Consequently, the Birnbaum doctrine barred maintenance of
a 10b-5 action by the plaintiffs." In an opinion48 described by the dis-
sent49 as "exhibiting a preternatural solicitousness for corporate well-
being and a seeming callousness toward the investing public,"5 as well
as "mire[d] in speculation and conjecture not usually seen in its opin-
ions," 5 '. the majority enumerated several factors in support of its deci-
sion: legislative history of the securities laws, policy considerations, and
two decades of judicial precedent.2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Reliance upon the legislative and administrative history of section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 is inapposite.13 Even the Blue Chip Stamps major-
45. 492 F.2d at 142.
46. The SEC appeared before the Supreme Court as amicus curiae and urged abandon-
ment of the strict purchaser-seller requirement in favor of a more liberal causation-injury
approach. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, at 20-32, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975). For a discussion of the causation-injury approach, see notes
118-20 and accompanying text infra.
47. 95 S. Ct. at 1923.
48. The majority opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, was joined by Chief Justice
Burger, and Justices Stewart, White, Marshall and Powell. Justice Powell also filed a
concurring opinion, in which Stewart and Marshall joined. Id. at 1935.
49. Justice Blackmun filed the dissenting opinion, in which Justices Douglas and Bren-
nan joined. Id. at 1937.
50. Id. at 1938.
51. Id. at 1941.
52. The dissenting opinion describes these premises as "three blunt chisels" with which
to carve the Birnbaum doctrine into stone. Id. at 1937 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
53. The legislative and administrative history of the section and the rule have been
described in various ways. For example, Bromberg has stated:
Section 10(b) was one of the least controversial parts of the 1934 Act . . . . Of
nearly a thousand pages of hearings in the House, the combined references to
§ 10(b) would scarcely fill a page. Much the same is true in the Senate. The
several committee Reports . . . add little or nothing to the evidence on intent
.... The floor debates are no more enlightening.
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ity recognized that the available extrinsic evidence was "not conclu-
sive.,""' The Court further noted that it "would be disingenuous to sug-
gest that either Congress in 1934 or the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission in 1942 foreordained the present state of the law with respect
to 10b-5."55 Nevertheless, the reaffirmance of Birnbaum has the effect
of confining the state of 10b-5 development to the level originally con-
templated by the Commission in 1942.56 This insistence on the
purchaser-seller limitation is inconsistent with the broad remedial scope
of the securities laws and of the Exchange Act of 1934 in particular.57
The use of the language "any person" in both the section and the rule
supports the conclusion that neither plaintiff nor defendant is required
to be a purchaser or seller.5" The fact that courts have held that the
defendant need not be a purchaser or seller59 emphasizes that the
purchaser-seller doctrine is directed primarily to the question of plain-
tiff's standing to maintain an action.60 Nor is the phrase "in connection
1 BROMBERG § 2.2, at 330-31 (Supp. 1970). Similarly, Whittaker has described the history
as "inconclusive." Whittaker, The Birnbaum Doctrine: An Assessment, 23 ALA. L. REV.
543, 584 (1971). Finally, one student has stated: "To the extent that the legislative history
shows anything meaningful, then, it does not support the Birnbaum construction of Rule
10b-5, but rather suggests that the section was to protect all investors." Comment, The
Purchaser-Seller Requirement of Rule lOb-5 Reevaluated, 44 U. CoLo. L. REV. 151, 154
(1972). See also Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative
Intent? 57 Nw. U. L. REV. 627, 642-60 (1963).
54. 95 S. Ct. at 1924.
55. Id. at 1926.
56. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
57. One commentator has remarked:
Arguably the words "in connection" in 10b-5 would not have been necessary if
only purchasers and sellers of securities were to be protected. Instead, a broad
definition of the protected class would be consistent with the draftsmen's intent
to cover not only fraud as to the "investment value" of the securities but also
novel or atypical methods of fraud.
Boone & McGowan, supra note 29, at 621-22. See also Ruder, Current Developments in
the Federal Law of Corporate Fiduciary Relations-Standing to Sue Under Rule 10b-5,
26 Bus. LAW. 1289 (1971), who feels that the result in Birnbaum was unnecessary because
the words "directly or indirectly," found in both 10(b) and lOb-5 "give sufficient latitude
to a court wishing to allow suits by shareholders who still hold their stock." Id. at 1294.
58. See generally Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Rule: An Archaic Tool For Determin-
ing Standing Under Rule 10b-5, 56 GEo. L.J. 1177 (1968); Note, The Purchaser-Seller
Limitation to SEC Rule 10b-5, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 684 (1968).
59. See, e.g., Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), holding that there was no
necessity for the defendant to be trading contemporaneously in securities in order to be
held liable under rule 10b-5.
60. It should be further noted that nothing in the section or the rule focuses upon the
plaintiff; in fact, the "any person" phrase in this context refers exclusively to the defen-
dants. See also Note, Standing to Sue in 10b-5 Actions: Eason v. GMAC and Its Impact
on the Birnbaum Doctrine, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1131, 1140-42 (1974).
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with a purchase or sale of any security" conclusive evidence of a
purchaser-seller requirement. On the contrary, this language requires
that there be a nexus between the proscribed conduct and a securities
transaction." This argument is buttressed by the language "directly or
indirectly," found in both the section and the rule."2
After surveying the remedies provided by the securities statutes, the
Court in Blue Chip Stamps, concluded that "[wihen Congress wished
to provide a remedy to those who neither purchase nor sell securities, it
had little trouble doing so expressly."63 This statement seems to be
begging the question since it is equally clear that if Congress had wished
to impose a purchaser-seller limitation in section 10b (or the SEC in rule
10b-5), it could have done so expressly.
Although neither the legislative history of section 10(b) nor the ad-
ministrative history of rule 10b-5 discloses an intent to create a private
remedy, two decades of judicial decisions have not only created a private
remedy, but have also expanded the class of 10b-5 plaintiffs. 4 Consider-
ing this expansion of the remedy and the repeated amicus curiae ap-
pearances by the SEC calling for the abandonment of the Bimbaum
limitation 5 it is of little comfort to the investing public that the
One commentator has thus concluded that section 10(b) lacks the foundation upon
which the purchaser-seller limitation may be engrafted. An analysis of that limitation
should be based upon the section because it is inappropriate for the courts to conclude
that the limitation is derived by resort to the rule placed in juxtaposition to the 1942
release, see note 8, supra. The writer buttresses this conclusion by noting that the Com-
mission is not bound to its 1942 interpretation of the rule; nor has it exhausted its rule-
making authority under section 10(b) with the promulgation of rule 10b-5. Comment,
Dumping Birnbaum to Force Analysis of the Standing Requirement under Rule lOb-5-
Eason v. GMAC, 6 LovoLA (Cm.) L.J. 230, 234 (1975). See also 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION, 1469 n.87 (1961). This approach finds further support in the fact that no case,
to date, has declared whether the Birnbaum standing requirement is compelled by the
section or the rule, or both.
For further discussion of the requirements regarding standing, see Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83 (1968) (constitutional requirements); Association of Data Processing Serv. Org.
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (non-constitutional requirements). See also Note,
Standing to Sue in 10b-5 Actions: Eason v. GMAC and Its Impact on the Birnbaum
Doctrine, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1131, 1140-42 (1974).
61. See Whittaker, supra note 53, at 583.
62. See note 57, supra.
63. 95 S. Ct. at 1925.
64. See note 125, infra.
65. The Securities and Exchange Commission, rather than promulgate further guide-
lines for the conduct of litigation under 10b-5, has contented itself to file amicus curiae
briefs, leaving development of the section and the rule to the courts. Some of the cases in
which the Commission has appeared as amicus curiae are: Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd.,
473 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1973); Mount Clemens Indus. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972);
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Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps has chosen to preserve a doctrine
ill-suited to deter the fraud which arises in an economic environment
of complex corporate transactions."6
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Finding inconclusive support for the Birnbaum doctrine in legislative
and administrative history, the Court turned to policy considerations.
Although consideration of policy accounts for the bulk of the majority
opinion, it comprises the weakest link in support of the purchaser-seller
limitation .
The Supreme Court adverts to a fear of "conjectural and speculative
recovery" 8 by plaintiffs who are neither purchasers nor sellers, who base
their damages upon a "subjective hypothesis" of the number of shares
they would have purchased or sold but for the fraud. In support of this
premise the Court cites section 28(a) of the 1934 Act 9 which limits
recovery in private damage actions to the actual damages suffered. Al-
though case law under this section has repeatedly limited recovery to a
measure of out-of-pocket damages, 0 the cases of Affiliated Ute Citizens
of Utah v. United States' and Myzel v. Fields" demonstrate that this
is by no means an ironclad rule. As these two cases indicate, where there
Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971); Iroquois Indus. Inc. v. Syracuse China
Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
66. The court indicated that any revocation of the purchaser-seller requirement should
be made by Congress. 95 S. Ct. at 1932.
67. See Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), in
which the-seventh circuit, in declaring that Birnbaum was no longer applicable law for
the circuit, found similar policy arguments to be largely speculative and unpersuasive. Id.
at 660-61.
68. 95 S. Ct. at 1925.
69. 15 U.S.C. §78bb(a) (1970). See note 43, supra.
70. See, e.g., Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1973).
71. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). The Court found that the actual sale prices of stock sold
pursuant to fraudulent inducements were an insufficient basis for determining the dam-
ages incurred. Instead, the Court took into account numerous factors, including the pres-
ence of unknown quantities of mineral deposits upon Indian lands and the existence of
unliquidated claims against the United States, in reaching a valuation per share upon
which "reasonable inferences may be drawn" and which has "sufficient support in the
record." Id. at 155-56.
72. 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). The court held that
the effect of section 28 (a) was to limit punitive damages that were otherwise available
under state remedies. It permitted a recovery of a sum equal in value to the stock, which
plaintiff was fraudulently induced to sell, if the jury found that with full disclosure of the
facts, he would have retained his stock until the higher price gained by the wrongdoer was
attained. Id. at 745.
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is sufficient evidence upon which the finder of fact may make a reason-
able inference as to the loss sustained, the proviso limiting recovery to
"actual damages" is not violated.73
The factual circumstances of Blue Chip Stamps disclosed sufficient
evidence from which such reasonable inferences may be made. The
court of appeals noted:
The consent decree required defendant-appellees to offer particular
securities to a specific, identifiable group of non-stockholding retail
users of Blue Chip Stamps, including plaintiff-appellant, and plaintiff-
appellant had a right to buy those securities at a fixed price and in a
fixed amount. The complaint alleges an objective measure of the
amount of loss based on subsequent sales by the defendants. 4
The fact that the consent decree provisions were a bargain75 indicates
an ability to acquire the shares offered. It is reasonable to infer that the
plaintiff-appellees would have purchased the amount to which they
were entitled." In short, there was no speculative basis for recovery here.
The holding in Blue Chip Stamps is indicative of the failure of the
purchaser-seller limitation to adequately fulfill the remedial and pro-
phylactic nature of the securities laws. By the Court's own admission,
the Birnbaum rule "unreasonably prevents some deserving plaintiffs
from recovering damages which have in fact been caused by violation
of rule 10b-5. .. and to that extent is undesirable."77 Nevertheless, the
Court found countering advantages to the maintenance of the Birnbaum
rule in policy considerations which, not surprisingly, "are more difficult
to articulate than . . the disadvantages."78
The Court speaks of "a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and
in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general."7 This reli-
ance upon "vexatiousness" is misplaced. For example, section 11(e) of
the 1933 Act,8" was cited by the Court as evidence of congressional
concern for limiting "vexatious" litigation. Section 11(e), however, was
73. Professor Bromberg has noted that very few 10b-5 cases have been decided upon
the merits. Thus, there is relatively little authority on relief, and section 28(a), which
limits recovery to "actual damages," "offers little help in determining what actual dam-
ages are." 3 BROMBERG §9.1 (1967). See also Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
74. 492 F.2d at 142.
75. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
76. 492 F.2d at 142.
77. 95 S. Ct. at 1926, 1929.
78. Id. at 1927.
79. Id.
80. 15 U.S.C. §77k(e) (1970). This section provides for a court to require a plaintiff to
pay costs if the court determines that the suit brought by plaintiff was without merit.
19751
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
properly designed to control vexatious litigation under the 1933 Act,
quite apart from any consideration of the plaintiff class under 10(b) or
10b-5 of the 1934 Act." Moreover, even without a specific statutory
provision, the federal district courts are eminently capable of discerning
"strike" or nuisance suits from meritorious claims. In dismissing the
complaint in Christophides v. Porco,s2 the court noted:
The complaint herein is representative of a growing number of 10b-5
suits brought in this Court on unique, esoteric and implausible legal
theories. Innovation is not to be discouraged, nor the imaginative in-
stinct dulled. However, claims cloaked in a tissue of confusion devoid
of federal jurisdiction or legal merit, impede rather than foster progress
in the field of investor protection."
The Court fears that elimination of the Birnbaum doctrine will lead
to "the potential for possible abuse of the liberal discovery provisions
of the federal rules," 4 resulting in a concomitant disruption of normal
business activities. Nevertheless, the anxiety expressed by the majority
opinion in this regard is subject to relief by way of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c)85 which provides for the issuance of "protective orders"
during discovery proceedings.8"
81. Cf. McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961), which rejected the
concept of imposing by analogy the restrictions and requirements found in other provisions
of the securities laws. Thus, the court held that the various civil liability provisions of the
securities laws did not manifest a uniform policy favoring the posting of a security for
expenses, and did not imply such a limitation in 10(b) actions. Id. at 836-37. See also Ellis
v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 272-74 (9th Cir. 1961). See generally 1 BROMBERG §2.5(2) (Supp.
1968).
82. 289 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
83. Id. at 406.
84. 95 S. Ct. at 1928.
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) provides:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and
for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively,
on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition
is to be taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or ex-
pense. ...
86. In a different context, one wonders whether this new found concern for the abuse
of discovery proceedings will spell an end to the enforcement of the antitrust laws which
have now been enforced for more than eight decades and stand as a commitment to the
principle of free competition. See, e.g., the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1-2
(1970); the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970). This writer cannot imagine a
more pervasive and in depth use of discovery techniques than those which accompany
charges of engaging in "conspiracy" or "reciprocity" under the Sherman Act. See, e.g.,
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), (conspiracy); United
States v. General Dynamics, 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), (reciprocity). It is conceiva-
[Vol. 25:132
BLUE CHIP STAMPS
The Court's "vexatiousness" argument also relies on the theory that
most companies will opt for a settlement rather than endure drawn out
litigation that involves disruption of normal business activities and the
hazards of oral proof.8 7 This purported fear of oral proof is unfounded
because the courts have the capacity to develop rules allocating the
burden of corroboration to the plaintiff." Similarly, to attach as sole
motive to those companies who settle without trial the desire to avoid
nuisance suits does not comport with reality. For example, Professor
Ruder has commented that many settlements are motivated by a defen-
dant's fear of substantial damage judgments following a trial on the
merits.89 An invalid claim, on the other hand, would not elicit such fears.
Finally, the majority fears that abandonment of the Birnbaum rule
will result in a recovery based largely on speculation, compelled by the
plaintiffs subjective hypothesis as to the extent of his financial loss."
This would necessitate the "fashioning of unique rules of corroboration
and damages" for the purpose of correcting the alleged dangers of an
expanded class of plaintiffs. 1 Yet, an important function of courts is to
develop such rules. In the case of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 2 for
example, the Supreme Court has shown no aversion to refashioning
unique rules of damages, even if this entails overturning damage rules
which have existed for two centuries.
The Court's misplaced fear of speculative recovery, vexatious litiga-
tion and abuse of discovery detracts from their thorough consideration
of the substantive issues which lie at the heart of 10(b) and 10b-5 ac-
tions, namely, whether the plaintiff sustained a loss as a consequence
of fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.
Two DECADES OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
The majority opinion in Blue Chip Stamps, in analyzing the case law
decided since 1952, curtly observed: "virtually all lower federal courts
ble that this type of proceeding would be in jeopardy and is probably what prompted the
dissent to conclude that "acceptance of this decisional route in this case may well come
back to haunt us elsewhere before long." 95 S. Ct. at 1942 (Blackman, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 1927-29.
88. See generally Hinds v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 155 Me. 349, 155 A.2d 721 (1959)
(presumptions); Fornoff, Presumptions: The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 24 ARK.
L. REV. 401 (1971); McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of a
Burden of Persuasion, 68 HARv. L. REV. 1382 (1955).
89. Ruder, Challenging Corporate Action under Rule 10b-5, 25 Bus. LAW. 75, 76 (1969).
90. 95 S. Ct. at 1930.
91. Id. at 1929.
92. 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (Supreme Court refashioned the damage rules in defamation
cases).
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facing the issue in the hundreds of reported cases presenting this ques-
tion over the past quarter century have reaffirmed Birnbaum's conclu-
sion."" Yet a close examination of the cases leads to the conclusion that
courts have struggled to expand the plaintiff class for 10(b) and 10b-5
actions to meet the complex and fraudulent schemes appearing in
corporate transactions. 4 Although most courts have achieved this result
within the context of the purchaser-seller limitation, the strained inter-
pretations that have denominated certain transactions as purchases or
sales and certain plaintiffs as purchasers or sellers only serve to empha-
size the necessity for a reexamination of Birnbaum's viability. 5 Brom-
berg, a noted commentator, after surveying the last two decades of
securities litigation, has concluded that the buyer-seller requirement
has been significantly "whittled away. 9 6
A direct consequence of these decisions has been the appearance of a
schism among the circuit courts, the SEC and members of the corporate
bar. It has manifested itself in the following areas: (1) sale of control;
(2) definitions of purchase and sale; (3) injunction suits; (4) expansion
of the meaning of the "in connection with" requirement of 10(b) and
10b-5; (5) the causation-injury substitute; and (6) qualifications and
inconsistencies .9 7
93. 95 S. Ct. at 1923.
94. This goal has led one appellate court to declare:
In deciding whether a plaintiff has standing, we search for what will best accom-
plish the congressional purpose .... Thus we construe the "in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security" clause found in both the section and the
rule broadly and flexibly to effectuate that purpose .... The "purchaser"-
"seller" standing requirement is to be similarly construed ... so that the broad
design of the section and the rule is not frustrated by the use of novel or atypical
transactions.
Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 806-07 (5th Cir. 1970).
95. There is nothing unique in this conclusion; in fact, much of this writer's research
covers terrain which has been traversed many times before. See, e.g., Froelich & Spiegel,
supra note 30; Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-
5, 54 VA. L. REV. 268 (1968); Comment, Dumping Birnbaum, supra note 60; Comment,
Purchaser-Seller Requirement Reevaluated, supra note 53; Comment, The Decline of the
Purchaser-Seller Requirement of Rule l1b-5, 14 VILL. L. REV. 499 (1969); Comment, supra
note 58; Note, Chipping Away at the Birnbaum Doctrine: Manor Drug Store v. Blue Chip
Stamps, 8 LOYOLA (L.A.) L. REV. 171 (1975); Note, Limiting the Plaintiff Class: Rule
10b-5 and the Federal Securities Code, 72 MIcH. L. REV. 1398 (1974); Note, Standing to
Sue: Eason v. GMAC, supra note 60; Note, supra note 58.
96. 2 BROMBERG §8.8 (Supp. 1968).
97. In order to facilitate analysis and trace the evolution of 10b-5 standing require-
ments, several commentators have chosen to categorize the cases adjudicated under
10b-5. See, e.g., Boone & McGowan, supra note 29; Ruder, supra note 57; Whittaker,
supra note 53.
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1. Sale of Control
Because the Birnbaum case has been generally acknowledged as a
"sale of control" case, courts have often held that the mere sale of
control for a premium, without more, is not cognizable under 10b-5.11
Nevertheless, the "sale of control" cases do not constitute a monolithic
approach resulting in a denial of 10b-5 actions, and the courts have
granted relief in appropriate cases." Boggess v. Hogan,1'® an obvious
departure from Birnbaum, is instructive of the manner in which the
strict purchaser-seller requirement has been ignored by the courts. The
case involved a sale of control at a premium, a subsequent public tender
offer at a lower price and also looting or waste of the corporate assets.,'"
98. See, e.g., Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), in which the
plaintiff sued derivatively and representatively on behalf of the corporation and share-
holders to recover the alleged premium (over seven million dollars above the prevailing
market price) received from the sale of 1.5 million shares of Alleghany common stock to
Gamble-Skogmo. The court held that on these facts alone, there was not a claim upon
which relief could be granted under 10b-5. Accord, Erling v. Powell, 429 F.2d 795 (8th Cir.
1970); Christophides v. Porco, 289 F.Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
99. See, e.g., Ferraioli v. Cantor, 281 F.Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), in which the plain-
tiff contended that the defendants offered some stockholders of General Baking the oppor-
tunity to sell their stock at a premium, but further alleged that no such offer was made
to him or the other shareholders whom he was representing. Additionally, no disclosure
of the negotiation regarding the sale of control was made to the plaintiff or members of
the class. The court held:
It is not necessary for the court to reach the question of whether a controlling
stockholder violates Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when he sells his control stock
at a premium without notifying any of the other stockholders. It is sufficient
here to hold that where a control stockholder invites some but not other stock-
holders to participate in the sale, a claim may be stated.
Id. at 357. There was no problem regarding the standing requirement in this case because
plaintiff had sold his shares, but not at a premium. The larger problem, however, is
reconciling this case with Birnbaum. Birnbaum involved substantially similar facts, in-
cluding the accusation of a failure on the part of the defendants to disclose the premium
at which the stock was being acquired. More importantly, however, the rationale of this
case would be applicable even if the shareholders had not sold, for the injury sustained,
that is, the difference in price between the prevailing market value and the premium
received would be the same. But see Haberman v. Murchison, 331 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), in which the court refused to follow the Cantor decision.
100. 328 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
101. The suit brought derivatively and representatively by the minority shareholders
of plaintiff corporation, alleged that the corporate defendant, which had acquired a major-
ity interest in the plaintiff corporation, had failed to disclose that "insiders" in the ac-
quired corporation were secretly offered a premium to breach their fiduciary duties in
regard to the subsequent tender offer. Plaintiffs further alleged that the defendant failed
to reveal its plans to exploit the business and assets of the acquired corporation.
This case is also interesting because it focuses on problems involving a tender offer.
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The gravamen of the complaint was an injury to the corporation and its
shareholders through a fraudulent substitution of shareholder status in
one company for the same status in another company. None of the
members of the plaintiff class had actually sold their stock pursuant to
the tender offer; rather, they had acquired shares in the new corporate
entity in exchange for their original stock. However, relying on the sev-
enth circuit's only "nominal recognition of the Birnbaum rule," ' 2 the
court found no reason to resolve the dispute as to the existence of a
sale." 3 Therefore, this complaint was sufficient to recognize a merito-
rious claim under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.104 The outcome of this
case, nevertheless, would appear to meet with the approval of the major-
ity in Blue Chip Stamps, which recognizes derivative suits as a tradi-
tional exemption from the Birnbaum doctrine.'05 The plaintiff in a deriv-
ative suit need not be a purchaser or seller in the securities transaction;
a shareholder may sue derivatively whenever the corporation has en-
gaged in a securities transaction with a party whose conduct is pro-
scribed by the rule." 6
2. Definition of Purchase and Sale
To effectuate the broad remedial purposes of the section and the rule,
the courts have expanded the definitions of purchase and sale.0 7 In the
One commentator has noted that the rise to popularity of the tender offer was the greatest
strain upon Birnbaum. Whittaker, supra note 53, at 544. Until the Williams Act, Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, §§13 (d)-(e), 14(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. §§78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f)
(1970), was passed in 1968, rule 10b-5 was the only federal law regulating the tender offer.
The purpose of the act is to proscribe fraud in connection with tender offers. For two novel
cases involving tender offers that were litigated under 10b-5 see Crane Co. v. Westing-
house Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970);
Neuman v. Electronic Speciality Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP., 92,591 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
102. 328 F. Supp. at 1051.
103. Id. See also notes 122-24 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of "forced
sale".
104. 328 F. Supp. at 1053. Contra, Erling v. Powell, 429 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1970);
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952); Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Nevertheless, the out-
come in this case would appear to meet with the approval of the majority in Blue Chip
Stamps, which recognizes two of the three general classes of plaintiffs traditionally barred
by the Birnbaum doctrine.
105. 95 S. Ct. at 1926. See note 128 and accompanying text infra.
106. See, e.g., Shell v. Hensley, 430 F. 2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Herpich v. Wallace, 430
F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Rekant v. Dresser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970); Shoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, Manley v. Shoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906
(1969).
107. The statutory definitions of purchase and sale include contracts to purchase and
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leading case of Hooper v. Mountain State Securities Corporation,5 0 the
action was brought by a trustee in bankruptcy seeking relief for the
corporation which was misled by fraud, causing it to issue its stock in
return for "spurious assets." The court held that this transaction consti-
tuted a sale within the meaning of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, permit-
ting the trustee of the defrauded corporation to maintain this action as
a seller.' In this case, as well as in other cases,"' the courts have demon-
strated an inclination to accommodate various transactions within the
purview of the statutory definitions of purchase and sale.
3. Injunction Suits
Courts have often avoided the strict purchaser-seller limitation in
instances where the plaintiff sought injunctive relief."' Implicit in these
sell. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§3(a)(13)-(14), 15 U.S.C. §§78c(a)(13)-(14) (1970).
108. 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961). See also SEC v.
National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (mergers); Dudley v. Southeastern Factor and Fin.
Corp., 446 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971) (liquidations);
Rekant v. Dresser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970) (issuance of promissory note); Movielab
Inc. v. Berkey Photo Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd per curiarn, 452 F.2d
662 (2d Cir. 1971) (notes); Fidelis Corp. v. Litton Indus. Inc., 293 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (corporate sale of assets and shares received in exchange); Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951). But cf. Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp.
234 (D. Neb. 1972) (merger).
109. 282 F.2d at 203, 205. Accord, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.
1964).
110. See cases cited in note 108, supra.
111. The principal case in this area is Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d
540 (2d Cir. 1967). Plaintiff sued defendant corporation which had made a tender offer
for Kress Corporation stock. The alleged 10b-5 violation arose out of the defendant's
failure to disclose, in the tender offer, the true value of the Kress real estate holdings and
the plan to sell, for an inadequate consideration, this real estate to Genesco's pension
fund. This sale of real estate enabled the defendant to raise the funds needed to pay for
the stocks acquired, thereby financing the acquisition of the Kress stock with Kress's own
assets. It was further alleged that the defendant, after gaining a controlling interest in
Kress, manipulated the price of the stock with a view towards persuading other Kress
stockholders to sell to the defendant. The court found the causal connection between the
fraud in the tender offer and an injury to plaintiff slim because plaintiffs had purchased
their stock after the alleged deceptions involved in the tender offer and therefore the court
denied a suit for damages on this count. But cf. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (assessable damages); Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco
Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965) (sufficient causal connection). Nevertheless, plain-
tiff was permitted to maintain a suit for injunctive relief in connection with the stock
manipulation which occurred after plaintiff had purchased its stock. The fact that plain-
tiff was simply a shareholder, and neither a purchaser nor a seller as a result of the
defendant's manipulation of the Kress stock, was not controlling in a claim for injunctive
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proceedings are private attorneys general who supplement the enforce-
ment powers granted the SEC."' Private enforcement is essential be-
cause the opportunity for fraud in the securities community is greater
than the capacity of the Justice Department and the SEC to police and
prevent it. More importantly, these injunctions protect the potential
investor by halting the proscribed conduct prior to its occurrence. This
is consistent with one purpose of the securities law; namely, to protect
the investing public, including corporations, from transactions and
machinations conceived with a fraudulent purpose."'
4. Expansion of the Meaning of the "in connection with" Requirement
of 10(b) and 10b-5
Courts have given novel interpretations to section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 in discerning the requisite connection between the alleged injury
and a securities transaction. One of the most novel and expansive defini-
tions to date comes from the case of Voege v. American Sumatra To-
bacco Corp. "' This case demonstrates that the mere purchase of stock
in a corporation, irrespective of its proximity in time to or consequence
of any 10(b) or 10b-5 violation, may meet the requirement of a nexus
between the injury and the purchase or sale of a security."5 A fully
relief because these claims largely avoid issues of injury and causation, cure a continuing
harm suffered by shareholders who hold their stock, and provide relief from future viola-
tions of the rule. 384 F.2d at 547.
112. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §21(e), 15 U.S.C. §78u(e) (1970). The Supreme
Court in Blue Chip Stamps noted that the purchaser-seller requirement does not affect
the SEC's standing in seeking injunctive relief under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. On the
other hand, the Court is conspicuously silent as to private injunctive actions, thereby
casting doubt upon the validity of this remedial route for violation of the securities laws.
95 S. Ct. at 1933 n.14.
113. See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (equita-
ble relief includes the power to require "insiders" to relinquish the profit made as a result
of their trading on inside information); Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Fielding, 309
F. Supp. 1146 (D. Nev. 1969) (a non-purchaser-seller entitled to injunctive equitable relief
is also entitled to the equitable relief on an accounting).
114. 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965). Plaintiff, suing individually, representatively, and
derivatively, alleged violation of 10b-5 as a consequence of a series of transactions which
culminated in a merger requiring minority shareholders, including plaintiff, to surrender
their stock at a price beneath its real value. This merger was brought about by two
corporations which held a controlling interest in the target company in an attempt to
appropriate the assets to themselves. The plaintiff neither sold her shares nor elected to
accept the $17 per share in lieu of securities or other consideration. She demanded an
appraisal pursuant to state law but took no further action thereon. The court held that
the plaintiff was a seller; the "forced sale" in these circumstances was sufficient to satisfy
the seller requirement.
115. The court expanded the meaning of the "in connection with the purchase of sale
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developed federal law of fiduciary responsibility to securities investors
may be postulated as a consequence of the extensive corporate liability
imposed by Voege. Given the federal courts' authority to fashion reme-
dies when federal rights are involved"' and a federal law of fiduciary
responsibility, a concomitant decline of the traditional state responsibil-
ity in the area of corporate mismanagement is foreseeable.'
5. The Causation-Injury Substitute for Birnbaum
In the leading case of Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,"'
the seventh circuit rejected the strict purchaser-seller limitation of
Birnbaum and instead relied upon a causation-injury test for defining
the plaintiff class under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. The court, in
of any security" requirement when it determined that the plaintiff, in purchasing her
stock twenty years earlier, had relied upon the honesty and fair dealing of the company.
Plaintiff necessarily relied upon this all important condition when, by acquiring
her shares, she agreed . . . that Old Company could be merged upon terms later
to be determined. Plaintiff .. .was the subject of deception for when she
acquired her stock she did so upon the justifiable assumption that any merger
would deal with her fairly, only later to find . . . that the terms of the merger
were designed to defraud her.
Id. at 375.
116. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Corp., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), notes 10-
11 and accompanying text supra. See also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448 (1957); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
117. It is this writer's contention that, even with an expanded class of plaintiffs permit-
ted in 10b-5 actions, a harmonious balance may be maintained in our federal system. See
note 126, infra.
118. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973). Plaintiffs were shareholders of a corporation which
purchased a car leasing business from defendants. The corporate purchaser issued shares
of its stock to the seller, and the plaintiffs individually guaranteed certain liabilities
assumed by the corporate purchaser. The business failed, and the purchasing corporation
became insolvent and defaulted upon the notes. The basis of the 10b-5 complaint was that
defendants made various misrepresentations and omissions regarding the viability of the
business. The defendants conceded violation of 10b-5, but maintained that plaintiffs
lacked standing to assert the 10b-5 claim. The court briefly examined principles of stand-
ing, the course of the decisions since Bimbaum, and concluded:
The emphasis on the injured party's status as an investor indicates that the
protection of the rule extends to persons who, in their capacity as investors,
suffer significant injury as a direct consequence of fraud in connection with a
securities transaction, even though their participation in the transaction did not
involve either the purchase or sale of a security.
Id. at 659. See also Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 435 (10th Cir. 1973); Young v.
Seaboard Corp., 360 F. Supp. 490, 494-95 (D. Utah 1973); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets,
Inc. 337 F. Supp. 834, 841 (D.N.J. 1972); Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, 290 F.
Supp. 715, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Comment, supra note 60; Note, supra note 60.
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focusing on the issue of standing, found it more useful to determine
whether plaintiffs were members of the class for whose special benefit
10b-5 existed. Its examination of the statutes, case law, and SEC policy
led it to conclude that the class of persons protected consisted of those
persons who were injured in their capacity as investors. The plaintiff in
Eason merely needed to prove that the injury was directly caused by a
fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security."9
The causation-injury approach can be seen as an appropriate substi-
tute for the Birnbaum limitation. The primary justification for the
Birnbaum rule is that it allegedly permits a precise determination of
plaintiff's injury thus avoiding hypothetical or speculative recovery. The
causation-injury approach still requires proof of injury as a direct conse-
quence of the fraud. 2 ' More important, the presence of the fraud be-
comes the sine qua non of the right to sue,' freeing the courts from
becoming mired in technical questions of standing and enabling them
to define appropriate damage rules on an ad hoc basis.
6. Qualifications and Inconsistencies
The other instances in which courts have shown reluctance to adhere
to Birnbaum have been collected under the rubric of "qualifications and
inconsistencies." The most cited and accepted qualification is the
"forced seller" concept. 2 An interesting example is provided by Crane
Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 2 where plaintiff's tender offer was
defeated when its competitor acquired the target company, merged with
119. 490 F.2d at 659. The Supreme Court rejected the causation-injury approach in
Blue Chip Stamps, 95 S. Ct. at 1926 n.8.
120. As in Blue Chip Stamps, each case must stand upon its own facts; however, the
requirement of "actual damages" is satisfied when there is evidence sufficient upon the
record enabling the trier of fact to make a reasonable inference. For a discussion of the
kinds of evidence from which reasonable inferences can be made, see notes 71-77 and
accompanying text supra.
121. Lowenfels, supra note 95, at 276.
122. See, e.g., Coffee v. Permian Corp., 306 F. Supp. 1371 (N.D. Tex. 1969), aff'd, 474
F.2d 1040 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 920 (1973); Dudley v. Southeastern Factor &
Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d 303 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971); Vine v. Beneficial
Fin. Corp., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967). -
123. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). Plaintiff Crane made
a tender offer for shares of Westinghouse Air Brake Co. Air Brake, in a move to defeat
the tender offer, began merger negotiations with Crane's major competitor, Standard.
Standard purchased and sold large blocks of Air Brake, thereby manipulating the market,
driving up the price of the stock, and defeating the tender offer. Upon successful comple-
tion of the merger, it appeared that Crane owned 32% of the outstanding stock. Crane was
subsequently forced to sell under threat of an antitrust divestiture action instigated by
Standard. The court concluded that Crane was a "forced seller."
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it and thereby forced Crane to sell its acquired stock. The perplexing
aspect of the case arises from the fact that standing was conferred on a
"forced seller" basis. This transaction did not result in injury; rather,
the efforts of Standard in the manipulation of the market caused Crane,
which had purchased "low," to realize a profit of several million dollars.
In short, there was no injury "in connection with" the securities transac-
tion. This decision, as so many others, serves to demonstrate the
strained interpretations in which courts will engage when attempting to
provide remedies for conduct proscribed in section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
and still comply with the purchaser-seller requirement.'24
The cases concerning unconsummated transactions tainted by fraud
pose the most serious challenge to the Birnbaum doctrine. 2 ' In these
cases the decision to forego a purchase or sale is a decision formed on
the basis of existing information. A principal purpose of the securities
laws has been to inform the investor and protect him from schemes
designed to defraud the careless and the uninformed. The Birnbaum
limitation leaves unremedied the victims of successful frauds directed
at deterring the purchase or sale of securities. To these victims, the Blue
124. Loss, commenting upon a similar transaction in Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Corp., 374
F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), noted:
Any deception in that case was in connection with an earlier stock acquisition
from the great bulk of plaintiffs fellow stockholders-a deception that did not
relate to the plaintiff, who never sold in the usual sense. The court's answer to
this contention-that it "ignores the simple fact that the plaintiff would never
be in a position of a forced seller were it not for the fraud"-does somewhat
shake the traditional view that only a defrauded buyer or seller can sue only the
person who defrauded him.
6 L. Loss, supra note 60, at 3623.
125. The doctrine has witnessed substantial erosion in this area. Some courts have held
that an investor is granted a private action in some instances where he has been misled
not to sell his securities. See, e.g., Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D.
Ill. 1967); Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 367 F.2d 157
(2d Cir. 1966); Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Some
courts have likewise recognized that a party to a contract to purchase or sell is a purchaser
or seller and may sue if the contract is not performed. See, e.g., Richardson v..MacArthur,
451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971); Allico Nat'l Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 397 F.2d
727 (7th Cir. 1968); A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Commerce
Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Similarly, some courts
have recognized the "aborted seller-purchaser" doctrine, in which the factual circumstan-
ces disclosed well-defined opportunities for a securities transaction. See, e.g., Travis v.
Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); Fenstermacher v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 351 F. Supp. 105 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974). Contra, Mount
Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972). See also note 122 and accompa-
nying text supra. Some courts have even acknowledged the equitable owners as purchasers
or sellers. See, e.g., James v. Gerber Prod. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973) (trust benefici-
ary); Dopp v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 461 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1972) (foreclosed pledgor).
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Chip Stamps majority's recognition of the Birnbaum disadvantages can
only be "cold comfort." Nor is there much comfort to be derived from
the Court's opinion that these disadvantages are mitigated by the exist-
ence of remedies under state law.' 6
This brief survey of the litigation brought under the section and the
rule was not meant to compel a conclusion that the Birnbaum doctrine
was without force in the United States courts.'27 Courts are at odds as
to the scope of the doctrine. They have ingeniously circumvented its
application and on occasion disavowed it. So viewed, it may be con-
cluded that the purchaser-seller requirement has long outlived its use-
fulness as a limiting doctrine in defining the perimeters of actions
brought under the section and the rule. An increase in the complexity
and sophistication of fraud arising in securities transactions has necessi-
tated the gradual disappearance of other limiting doctrines. For these
same reasons, the Birnbaum doctrine is no longer an appropriate vehicle
for defining the limits of the plaintiff class in 10(b) and 10b-5 actions.
The decision in Blue Chip Stamps, by injecting the doctrine with new
vitality, maintains arbitrary and artificial limits upon the plaintiff
class. As such, it denies access to a federal forum to those very persons
injured as a result of fraud in connection with a securities transaction.
THE IMPACT OF Blue Chip Stamps
The consequences of the Blue Chip Stamps decision are manifold.
The holding directs the district courts to mechanically apply the
purchaser-seller requirement without considering the defendant's culpa-
126. 95 S. Ct. at 1927 n.9. The reliance upon state law remedies is often insubstantial.
A survey of the state corporate laws will reveal different orientations. For example, Dela-
ware is oriented towards management; California is oriented towards the shareholder.
Most states probably fall in between these extremes. Consequently, protection for the
shareholder or investor varies from state to state, with uncertainty of protection being the
norm. See Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, DUKE L.J. 875 (1966). Professor Ruder
has concluded that a federal corporate law is therefore desirable:
Given the relative lack of shareholder protection in Delaware, the state where
certainty of result is the greatest, and the relative uncertainty of result in other
states, federal corporation law becomes an attractive alternative. Choice of fed-
eral law also reflects the fact that most corporations of moderate or large size
are owned by shareholders who reside in all .parts of the nation.
Ruder, supra note 57, at 1291-92.
127. See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974); Landy v. F.D.I.C.,
486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); Mount Clemens Indus., Inc.
v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972); Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999 (1971); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d
963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970).
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bility or the plaintiff's capacity to prevail on the merits. Nevertheless,
those district courts sensitive to meritorious claims from deserving
plaintiffs will continue to avoid its application by resorting to judicial
legerdemain or by contriving new exceptions.
By specifically endorsing the Birnbaum decision, the Blue Chip
Stamps holding limits the plaintiff class in 10(b) and 10b-5 actions to
actual purchasers and sellers. A closer examination of the opinion re-
veals that the Supreme Court, in deference to the decided case law of
the last two decades, recognized two important exceptions to the
Birnbaum rule: (1) derivative actions by shareholders who have neither
purchased nor sold securities;' 8 and (2) actions by those parties holding
contractual obligations and rights to purchase or sell securities, who
were prevented from engaging in a consummated securities transaction
due to an intervening fraud.'
There is no specific language in Blue Chip Stamps which may be cited
as affecting those cases decided under the rubrics of "definition of pur-
chase and sale," "forced seller," and "aborted purchaser" doctrines.
Nevertheless, several conclusions are possible. The Exchange Act of
1934 includes contractual rights within the definition of purchase'30 and
sale,' 3' and the Supreme Court has generally shown itself receptive to
an expansive definition of what constitutes a purchase or sale.'32 The
case of the "forced seller" presents a somewhat more difficult assess-
ment. The Supreme Court has never had occasion to rule upon such a
situation. Although a recognition of the "forced seller" concept would
be consistent with a broad definition of purchase and sale, the Court's
apparent hostility in Blue Chip Stamps to individual or representative
suits, except in the clearest of cases involving a purchase or sale, leads
to the conclusion that future litigation by a "forced seller" should be
based upon a derivative claim. Similarly, the Supreme Court has not
had any occasion to rule upon an action based upon an aborted transac-
tion. In those circumstances where contractual rights are disclosed,
plaintiffs are upon safe ground. On the other hand, a literal acceptance
of Blue Chip Stamps compels the conclusion that the Court will recog-
nize the aborted seller only under circumstances where the shareholder
sues derivatively.
128. 95 S. Ct. at 1926. Because the reaffirmation of Birnbaum extends only to the
standing requirements, it would be safe to say that the courts would not hesitate to
entertain a derivative action arising in a similar factual context.
129. Id. at 1932.
130. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(13), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1970).
131. Id. § 3(a)(14), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14).
132. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971);
SEC v. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
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The Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps, specifically rejected the
causation-injury approach.'33 Thus, past cases decided under a
causation-injury theory, unless otherwise maintainable, are of suspect
precedential value.
Those plaintiffs who sue on the theory that an intervening fraud
caused them not to purchase stock will be denied standing to litigate
under 10(b) and 10b-5. The opinion in Blue Chip Stamps thus presents
a contradictory position. That is, it would permit suits by would be
sellers of stock, who, because of the fraud, hold their stock; but, deny
standing to a would be purchaser of stock. The ground for denial in the
latter situation is that the determination of damages is too
speculative.'34 Surely, the former situation may arise in equally specula-
tive circumstances-namely, would the stockholder have sold, and, if
so, how many shares and at what point in time. Nevertheless, this
degree of speculation has not deterred the courts from determining dam-
ages in cases such as Myzel v. Fields'35 and Affiliated Ute Citizens of
Utah v. United States.3 6
As is true of most decisions, Blue Chip Stamps leaves more questions
unanswered than answered. Inasmuch as the decision does not specifi-
cally include injunctive suits as an exception to the Birnbaum rule,' 37 it
leaves doubt as to whether they remain an exception to the purchaser-
seller limitation. Even though the opinion allows circumvention of the
actual purchaser-seller requirement in derivative actions and in cases of
clearly defined opportunities for purchase or sale in instances when
contractual rights and duties exist, it leaves unanswered questions re-
garding which actions are cognizable as derivative or contractual. Al-
though it allows derivative actions to be maintained, it would seem to
cast doubt upon these same actions if they were brought by someone in
an individual or representative capacity. This problem can only lead to
the twin consequences postulated earlier-mechanical application or
circumvention of the purchaser-seller requirement. The end result will
be another era of judicial decisions fraught with all the vices which the
Supreme Court is expected to curtail; namely, forum shopping in those
circuits most sympathetic to 10b-5 claims and a conflict among the
circuits as to the vitality of the purchaser-seller requirement.
133. 95 S. Ct. at 1926 n.8.
134. Id. at 1925. See notes 68-69 and accompanying text supra.
135. 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). See note 72, supra.
136. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). See note 71, supra.
137. See note 112, supra.
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CONCLUSIONS
Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are the most litigated provisions of the
federal securities laws. The decision in Blue Chip Stamps will not serve
to check the amount of litigation brought under these provisions. To this
writer, it appears that an unspoken reason for reaffirming Birnbaum is
a concern for the federal structure.'38 One commentator refers to this as
an inability to reconcile the twin goals of "investor protection" and
"federal integrity."'39 But surely, the sheer volume of litigation brought
under 10b-5 is sufficient evidence to rebut the assertion of adequate
state protection in this regard. 40
The SEC response to the threat of "vexatiousness" and social cost is
also instructive and is worthy of quoting at length:
The existing exceptions to the Birnbaum rule allow some individuals
who neither purchased nor sold securities to bring suit, and so already
permit the vexatious litigation petitioners fear. Others may sue in the
hope of creating additional exceptions to the rule. Litigation over these
exceptions can be protracted and costly, as the instant case demon-
strates. Indeed, the combined social costs of strike suits falling within
the current exceptions and the costs of litigation determining the exist-
ence and scope of these exceptions may exceed whatever costs might
be incurred from allowing standing to all persons within the class pro-
tected by Rule 10b-5 who allege they have been injured by a defen-
dant's violation of it."'
The twenty-four years from Birnbaum to Blue Chip Stamps lend
themselves to several observations. The task of defining the limits of
10(b) has been left to the courts to fashion doctrine on an ad hoc basis.
This is unfortunate, for this task properly devolved upon the SEC. Yet,
the SEC has chosen not to exercise its prerogative. Instead, the
Commission has been content to assume a passive role as amicus curiae.
Because the Commission is a body with the essential expertise and
extensive rule-making authority, it is better suited than the courts to
138. The present Supreme Court has generally shown itself to be solicitous towards the
role of the states in the federal system. See, e.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 95 S. Ct. 2281 (1975);
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 95 S. Ct. 1200 (1975).
139. Note, supra note 60, at 1148.
140. The injured investor is more likely to base his claim upon a violation of section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 rather than upon state remedial provisions. One reason for this
preference lies in the advantages afforded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 3
BROMBERG § 11.2-11.4 (Supp. 1974). Another reason involves the inadequacy of the laws
of many states to protect the investing public. See note 126, supra.
141. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 32, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975).
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promulgate rules and regulations regarding section 10(b), and it should
instead leave to the courts their proper role of interpretation.
Inasmuch as the position of the SEC, as gleaned from their frequent
amicus curiae appearances, indicates a decided preference for the
causation-injury approach, the courts should properly defer such a judg-
ment to the administrative body charged with enforcement of the securi-
ties laws. Since causation and injury are the key elements in every 10b-
5 case,"' this approach is the one most consistent with the remedial and
prophylactic purposes of the securities laws in general and the language
of the section and the rule in particular. Although there exists fear that
this approach is too open-ended, and leads to speculative recovery and
substantial damages, this fear can be allayed by strict standards of proof
using materiality and reliance as guidelines. Courts can require that
the fraud "touch" a securities transaction,"' and further require that
the plaintiffs be within the class of persons who the section and the rule
were designed to protect. As was pointed out in Affiliated Ute Citizens
of Utah v. United States,"' damages are not speculative where there is
sufficient evidence in the record from which reasonable inferences may
be made as to "actual damages." That case also established that a
causal connection between the wrongful omission and the injury may be
presumed if the omission relates to facts to which a reasonable investor
would have attached significance. This presumption is particularly
applicable in cases involving potential investors, who because of a suc-
cessful fraud, neither purchased nor sold securities. In instances where
the relationship between the parties will not support such a presump-
tion, such as the absence of a face-to-face transaction, the plaintiff must
present evidence, independent of oral testimony, of a nexus between the
alleged proscribed conduct and the alleged injury.
Finally, in an effort to avoid strike and nuisance suits, it is suggested
that a provision similar to section 11(e) of the 1933 Act"' be added to
the 1934 Act. This should provide an adequate deterrent to the filing of
unmeritorious claims.' The costs of instituting federal litigation are
substantial, a factor partially attributable to the liberal provisions of the
142. See notes 118-21 and accompanying text supra.
143. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12-13
(1971).
144. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). See note 71, supra.
145. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970). See note 80, supra.
146. Such a statute should provide the court with broad discretion regarding the necess-
ity for posting any security for litigation expenses. The criteria for determining this post-
ing should focus upon whether the litigation was initiated in bad faith or is utterly without
merit. See generally 1 BROMBERG § 2.5(2) (Supp. 1968).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Faced with a very real threat of bur-
densome costs, potential plaintiffs would rarely hazard any vexatious
litigation.
These modest suggestions, which focus upon the economic realities
which inhere in securities transactions, permit the courts to focus upon
the merits of 10b-5 claims instead of the mechanics of standing. Unfor-
tunately, the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps chose to become
mired in the latter, and, in so doing, ignored its own wise counsel by
engaging in "glib generalizations and unthinking abstractions."'' 7
Robert C. Weisenberger
147. SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969).
